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Viviane Gravey and Andrew Jordan
Tyndall Centre, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK
ABSTRACT
The ﬁnancial crisis has triggered demands to halt and even reverse the
expansion of European Union (EU) policies. But have these and previous
demands actually resulted in policy dismantling? The existing literature has
charted the rise of dismantling discourses such as subsidiarity and better
regulation, but has not examined the net effect on the acquis. For the ﬁrst
time, this contribution addresses this gap in the literature through an
empirical study of policy change between 1992 and 2014. It is guided by a
coding framework which captures the direction of policy change. It reveals
that, despite its disposition towards consensualism, the EU has become a new
locus of policy dismantling. However, not all policies targeted have been cut;
many have stayed the same and some have even expanded. It concludes by
identifying new directions for research on a topic that has continually fallen
into the analytical blind spot of EU scholars.
KEY WORDS Austerity; blame avoidance; deregulation; environmental policy; European Union; policy
dismantling
Introduction
From the Dutch declaration on the end of an ‘ever closer union’ (Ministerie
van Buitenlandse Zaken 2013) to British demands for ‘red tape’ to be cut
(Business Taskforce 2013), recent years have witnessed repeated calls for
the pace of European Union (EU) policy expansion to be slowed and for
some policies to be removed or dismantled. Yet such calls appear somewhat
counterintuitive, as dismantling has long been dismissed as not simply
improbable at EU level but philosophically incompatible with the idea of an
‘ever closer union’. Given this context, how could policy dismantling,
deﬁned as the ‘cutting, diminution or removal of existing policy’ (Jordan
et al. 2013: 795), even take place?
Policy dismantling is certainly not a new concept, but it has been identiﬁed
as a means to bring together older debates. Questions of retrenchment were,
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of course, initially raised in relation to national welfare states (e.g., Green-Pe-
dersen 2004). Around the same time, related concepts such as deregulation,
regulatory reform and the regulatory state were developed by scholars study-
ing regulation (see e.g., Majone 1994). Writing in the pages of the Journal of
European Public Policy, Jordan et al. (2013) claimed that dismantling could
be used as an umbrella term to bring together these and other strands of
the literature. As it is not yet strongly linked to a particular policy sector,
policy type or level of governance, the concept of dismantling certainly
appears open enough to be applied to a new locus, namely the EU level,
where for a long time it has been assumed that EU policies can and indeed
must only ever expand ad inﬁnitum. Yet, in their recent research agenda con-
tribution, in which they argued strongly for a renewed focus on policy disman-
tling, Jordan et al. (2013) made little reference to the EU as either an agent or a
locus of dismantling.
Studies of policy dismantling in many settings – such as the welfare state
(Pierson 1994) – have usefully revealed the difﬁculties encountered by poli-
ticians trying to dismantle policies in contexts of distributed power. Thus,
Pierson (1994: 177) famously argued that whilst distributed power makes it
easier for politicians to ‘duck accountability’ (and hence blame) for cutting
policies, a greater number of potential veto players can also be expected to
bedevil attempts at retrenchment. In one of the world’s most consensual –
perhaps even hyperconsensual (Hix 2007: 145) – political systems, would-be
dismantlers can be expected to face signiﬁcant obstacles at EU level. Conse-
quently, repeated recourse to dismantling rhetoric may not necessarily trans-
late into (and indeed may be a symbolic substitute for) policy change. Yet,
without empirical research on how far dismantling discourses translate into
concrete instances of policy dismantling, it is impossible to know whether dis-
mantling has actually occurred at EU level.
To explore whether the EU has a ‘reverse gear’, this contribution investi-
gates for the ﬁrst time how far political demands for dismantling have fed
through to empirical instances of dismantling at EU level. To do so, it
unpacks and tests for many different forms of dismantling, ranging from a
diminution in ‘the number of policies in a particular area’ or in ‘the
number of policy instruments used’, through to a reduction in their ‘inten-
sity’ (Jordan et al. 2013: 802). In order to capture these many different
forms, this contribution treats dismantling as a relative concept measured
in respect to changes to the status quo. Furthermore, dismantling is
treated as one of three possible directions of policy change – alongside
expansion and a continuation of the status quo. Crucially, a single reform
can in principle witness changes in and across multiple directions. Bonoli
(2001: 240), for example, argued that in consensual political systems in par-
ticular, policy change could be an amalgam of expansion, stasis and
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dismantling, with two instruments of the same policy possibly moving in
different directions.
This contribution explores dismantling at EU level, as this constitutes a sig-
niﬁcant gap in the emerging literature. Given space constraints we have
elected to focus only on dismantling through legislative reform, although dis-
mantling can also occur during the implementation and enforcement stages
(Bauer et al. 2012). To maintain a manageable focus, it adopts a 22-year (1992–
2014) perspective on policy change in one particular policy area – environ-
mental protection. As dismantling is often empirically difﬁcult to capture
(among other reasons because of the well know political motivation to hide
it from target groups [Pierson 1994; Jordan et al. 2013]), we focus on the
environmental sector because it has witnessed the use of many active and
open dismantling strategies and discourses in the past (e.g., Golub 1996;
Jordan and Turnpenny 2012).
The next section begins by exploring why dismantling at EU level has not
received more scholarly attention. The third section identiﬁes examples of
active and observable dismantling pressure over 22 years. We pinpoint the
environmental directives and regulations that were targeted for dismantling
and discuss the methods used to measure resulting policy changes. In particu-
lar, we explain how our coding scheme builds on an approach to dismantling
developed by Bauer et al. (2012) and Knill et al. (2014), although it codes policy
change in a signiﬁcantly different manner. We then summarize our results.
Empirically, we reveal that in spite of its inherent hyperconsensuality (and
hence presumed bias towards policy stability), the EU has become a signiﬁ-
cant locus of both dismantling discourse and action. However, not all the pol-
icies targeted have actually been cut; many have stayed the same and/or have
even expanded. Next we discusse these puzzling ﬁndings in the light of
growing political demands for much more dismantling in a context of auster-
ity, and offer some tentative explanations. We conclude by identifying new
directions for research on a topic that has continually fallen into an analytical
blind spot of EU scholars.
The EU: a new locus of policy dismantling?
Political calls for policy dismantling at EU level are running well ahead of
policy research. Early work on subsidiarity and deregulation in the mid-
1990s (Golub 1996; Jeppesen 2000) failed to translate into a comprehensive
research programme. Consequently, we lack systematic studies of dismantling
at EU level that address fundamental questions such as what drives actors to
dismantle European policies, what strategies they deploy and whether these
activities translate into cuts to the acquis. Their absence is particularly surpris-
ing, given that policy dismantling research in general is experiencing a renais-
sance on both sides of the Atlantic (Bauer et al. 2012; Berry et al. 2010; Jordan
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et al. 2013). This section identiﬁes possible reasons for the paucity of disman-
tling research at EU level.
As policy dismantling researchers in Europe and America focused on
welfare state retrenchment in the 1990s (Green-Pedersen 2004; Pierson
1994), the EU – at the time, widely portrayed as a highly active ‘regulatory
state’ (Majone 1994) – seemed an altogether unpromising locus of disman-
tling research. The EU was expanding, both spatially and in its policy compe-
tences. Redistributive policies – an area where the EU’s competences were still
inchoate – were deemed to be the key target for retrenchment at the national
level. In his landmark study, Pierson (1994) made virtually no reference to the
EU. The rare retrenchment studies that did encompass the EU were concerned
with changes made to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), one of the EU’s
few redistributive policies (e.g., Coleman et al. 1997). But in the 2000s, research
on both sides of the Atlantic began investigating cuts, retrenchment or roll-
back across all policy areas. In the United States (US), Berry et al. (2010) pro-
duced cross-sectoral comparison of the ‘lives and deaths of federal programs’.
In Europe, Bauer et al. (2012: 34) worked across a mixture of environmental
and social cases in order ‘to develop and apply concepts that travel across
different policy areas’.
Yet research still remains heavily focused on a single level of governance –
the nation state (but see Leibfried [2010]; Jordan and Turnpenny [2012]).
Given that European integration has repeatedly involved transferring to the
EU level a wide array of policy competences (Pollack 1994), why has disman-
tling at EU level not received more scholarly attention? Rosamond argues that
analysts should critically reﬂect on the focus of EU studies from two perspec-
tives. From an internal perspective, the trajectory of a ﬁeld is ‘a function of the
changing nature of the EU over time’ (Rosamond 2007: 20). Hence, growing
discourses of dismantling – whether through debates about subsidiarity or
better regulation – should have triggered more research on the topic. Yet,
while the launch of the better regulation agenda in the 2000s did lead to
some research, EU scholars mostly focused on the discourses of change
and/or the more expansionary aspects of change (e.g., the emergence of
the processes and institutions of impact assessment [Turnpenny et al.
2009]), rather than dismantling (i.e., the cutting of the acquis).
An explanation for this analytical response may be found in Rosamond’s
second (i.e. external), perspective, where he argues that ‘how we read the
evolution of the EU is a function of the intellectual lenses we use’ (Rosamond
2007: 21). Could dominant theoretical approaches have blinded scholars to
the possibility of policy dismantling at EU level? EU theories are, of course,
multitudinous (Pollack 2005: 357) and certainly are not all are totally blind
to the possibility of dismantling; dismantling has even been associated with
neofunctionalist concepts such as spillback (Malamud 2010).
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Yet two features of EU scholarship have arguably militated against disman-
tling research. First, policy dismantling has long been assumed to be something
that happens to other levels of governance –with the EUunderstood as an exter-
nal force, enabling (Knill et al. 2009) or hindering (Jordan and Turnpenny 2012),
domesticdismantling.More speciﬁcally, dismantlinghasbeenseenasan effectof
Europeanization, i.e., of the EU’s impact on its member states. Hence, thirdly, the
key Treaty commitment to achieve an ‘ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe’ has been interpreted as entailing an increase in EU level policies and the
dismantling of some national rules – ‘positive integration’ (Scharpf 1996) going
hand in hand with ‘creeping competence’ (Pollack 1994).
Once competences were relocated at the EU level, two further obstacles
emerged: the perceived default preferences of key EU institutions – in particu-
lar the Commission and Parliament – and the EU’s hyperconsensual nature.
Taking the ﬁrst of these, the policy-dismantling literature has tended to
assume a ‘meta-preference for re-election’ amongst key dismantling actors
(namely elected politicians [Bauer and Knill 2012: 32]). Yet, in the EU, the insti-
gator of most policy changes – the non-elected European Commission – is
often assumed to be hardwired with a preference to increase its powers. Con-
sider the following, for example: ‘the Commission’s primary organizational
goals are (a) to expand the scope of Community competence to new areas
and (b) to increase its own competence and inﬂuence within the policy
process’ (Pollack 1994: 102). Meanwhile, the European Parliament has long
been presented as a natural ally of the Commission, taking ‘the most pro-inte-
gration and harmonisation position’ (Thomson et al. 2004: 250). Hence, when
considering actors directly engaged in the decision-making process, only
member states appear likely to favour dismantling at EU level, although
they may be supported by advocacy and/or civil society groups.
If all this were true, policy dismantling at EU level would be very difﬁcult:
not only would the Commission have to act against its presumed self-interest,
but any member states that were pro-dismantling would have to convince
both their peers inside the Council as well as the Parliament, now a co-legis-
lator, to support dismantling. Given the hyperconsensual nature of the EU,
one can immediately understand why so many scholars have so readily dis-
counted the mere possibility of dismantling.
But these assumptions are now being challenged. More actors seem willing
to countenance – and even actively seek – ‘less Europe’. It is no longer tenable
to assume that the Commission and the Parliament are forever tied to an ‘ever
closer’ and ever deeper union. As Dimitrakopoulos (2004) argues, the Commis-
sion should be considered both as an actor and as an arena in which different
Directorate Generals (DGs) vie for attention and support for their sectoral pol-
icies. Thus, DG Environment may oppose environmental policy dismantling,
even though the rest of the Commission supports it. Similarly, different com-
mittees within the Parliament have different policy expertise and may support
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different political priorities (Burns 2013). Furthermore, the EU level is becom-
ing increasingly politicized. Thus, members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
increasingly vote on ideological lines (Scully et al. 2012) and the Commission
itself has shifted to the right in the 2000s (Wille 2012). Political debate at EU
level implies discussions and disagreement between actors on the degree and
scope of public intervention, which in turn has included some calls for dis-
mantling. Although alien to the EU’s traditions, these are precisely the con-
ditions in which politicians in the US have long engaged in ﬁerce partisan
battles to dismantle one another’s policies (Berry et al. 2010).
Related to that – and again working from Rosamond’s (2007) external per-
spective – the entry of comparative politics approaches and ontologies has
led to the questioning of old orthodoxies in EU studies. This has opened up
many new avenues of research. For example – and going back to Pierson
(1994) – the hyperconsensual nature of EU decision-makingmaymean that dis-
mantling is difﬁcult, but (by blurring responsibilities and making blame avoid-
ance comparatively easier) by nomeans entirely impossible. Indeed, the limited
development of a European public sphere – with greater salience for certain
policies in certain member states (Viehrig and Oppermann 2008) – could be
regarded as facilitating blame avoidance at EU level. Moreover, blame avoid-
ance may not be a signiﬁcant factor in all attempts made to dismantle. While
proposals to dismantle the CAP, a redistributive policy with concentred
beneﬁts to well-organized farmers’ interests and diffuse costs, are likely to gen-
erate opposition in certain member states, the dismantling of EU environ-
mental policies (with their diffuse, long-term beneﬁts) may easily escape the
notice of voters. In fact Jordan et al. (2013: 803) contend that environmental
policy dismantling could conceivably bemotivated by a credit-claiming ration-
ale, and hence be pursued through more open and active dismantling strat-
egies. At EU level, many very powerful actors devote their energies to
eroding the ambition level of newpolicies – a struggle that does not necessarily
end after a policy has been adopted (Jacobs and Weaver 2015).
The attempted dismantling of EU policy
This section provides a short history of efforts to dismantle the environmental
acquis. It identiﬁes the directives and regulations that have been openly and
directly targeted for dismantling by member states and/or the Commission
between 1992 and 2014. It then describes the methods used to code the
observed policy changes.
Mounting dismantling pressures in the 1990s
The early 1990s, a period centred on the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, are
commonly perceived as marking the end of the ‘permissive consensus’ on
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European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2008). In the aftermath of the
Danish ‘no’ vote, subsidiarity was seized upon as a principle around which a
new distribution of EU competences could be organized. It imposed on the
Commission a need to more fully justify new EU-level action, and led to
demands for many existing pieces of legislation and proposals for new
ones to be rethought (Jeppesen 2000). A number of member states (the
United Kingdom [UK], France and Germany) and the Commission assembled
‘hit lists’ of items for reform (Golub 1996; Wurzel 2002). Water and air pollution
directives featured prominently on them (Jordan and Turnpenny 2012).
A decade later, the Commission launched an agenda of ‘better regulation’
at EU level in parallel with its Lisbon strategy (Radaelli 2007). While deregula-
tion is about legislative quantity, better regulation is supposed to be about
legislative quality (Tombs and Whyte 2013). Compared to the early 1990s,
the focus of the discourse had therefore shifted from subsidiarity – question-
ing the merits for EU action – to proportionality – making EU action more efﬁ-
cient (Jeppesen 2000: 99). After the 2005 review of the Lisbon Strategy, better
regulation was relaunched with a primary focus on creating growth and jobs
(forcefully supported by the use of impact assessments), and a secondary
focus on reducing administrative burdens (Radaelli 2007; Van Den Abeele
2010). Prominent supporters included the UK, the Netherlands, as well as
DG Enterprise, then under the leadership of Günter Verheugen (Löfsted
2007). The focus on the ‘growth and jobs’ dimensions of sustainable develop-
ment made environmental policy an obvious target: the Commission’s better
regulation initiative targeted waste legislation (Hjerp et al. 2010), whilst
environment was one of 13 priority areas for administrative burden reduction
(European Commission 2009).
Finally, the years following the 2008 banking crisis saw a further strength-
ening of the dismantling discourse within the Commission (European Com-
mission 2014; Van Den Abeele 2010). Environment Commissioner Potočnik
feared that environmental policies were increasingly being seen as a
‘luxury’ (Potočnik 2012: xvii) as the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Per-
formance Programme (REFIT) launched ﬁtness checks on freshwater, waste
and nature policy. In parallel, member states such as the UK and the Nether-
lands launched national reviews of the acquis (Business Taskforce 2013 Minist-
erie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2013), in which environmental policies (such as
the Air Quality and Environmental Impact Assessment Directives) featured
prominently.
Thus, several actors at EU level – notably some large member states and
even the Commission – increasingly promoted a discourse of dismantling.
This conﬁrms Jordan et al.’s (2013: 803) contention that attempts to
achieve environmental policy dismantling are likely to be active and
visible, underpinned by a credit-claiming logic. As for the biggest presumed
obstacle to EU level dismantling – the hyperconsensual nature of the
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European polity – there appears to be a growing consensus among key
actors on the value of better regulation. In the words of the then Commis-
sion President Barroso (2014: 1, 5), better regulation had changed from
being ‘something for specialists, for gourmets’ to being ‘common wisdom
in European circles’. But have these shifts in discourse culminated in
changes to the acquis?
Policies targeted
In order to ascertain whether the acquis has experienced dismantling, a subset
of the vast corpus of legislation adopted by the EU was selected. Our research
design was pragmatic, reﬂecting a wish to make an initial foray into what is a
new subﬁeld of EU policy analysis. Consequently, we focused on a policy area
– the environment – which has, as noted above, been repeatedly targeted for
dismantling.
Environmental policies comprise a sizeable portion of the EU acquis. This
environmental acquis goes beyond the ‘200 major legal acts’ discussed in enlar-
gement procedures (European Commission 2013) and is routinely expanded,
with between 20 and 100 new directives and regulations adopted per year
between 1994 and 2010 (Farmer 2012). In order to narrow down the number
of cases to a manageable number, we only coded the directives and regulations
that have been actively and openly targeted by politicians for dismantling, i.e.,
those listed either in the Commission’s reports on simpliﬁcation and/or the
member states’ ‘hit lists’. Moreover, as dismantling scholars remind us, disman-
tling should be explored by carefully comparing different generations of the
same legislative text. Thus, we chose cases that were reformed at least once
through the legislative process after being initially targeted up to the end of
the Barroso II Commission in 2014.
Applying these criteria produced a list of 19 environmental directives and
regulations, spread across seven sectors of environmental policy. In turn,
these have been reformed at least once (often multiple times), leading to
47 reforms in total. These reforms culminated in a much longer list of 75 direc-
tives and regulations, which are summarized in Table 1. Whilst the 19 direc-
tives and regulations were chosen at ﬁrst because they were openly
targeted for dismantling, including all 47 reforms (18 of which occurred
before, or between two calls for dismantling) accounts for both overt and
covert dismantling attempts.
To be clear, our sampling criteria imply that some of the environmental
directives and regulations targeted for reform in the period 1992–2014 are
not included in Table 1. For example, most environmental policies targeted
by REFIT have yet to be reformed and therefore do not appear (European
Commission 2014: 70–7). The sample size and criteria applied also mean
that the directives and regulations coded are not necessarily representative
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of the entire acquis – but representativeness is not needed to investigate
whether policy dismantling even occurs at EU level.
Methods to capture the direction of policy change
After developing the coding scheme, the successive legislative reforms pre-
sented in Table 1 were analysed to identify whether dismantling took place.
The scheme builds on the approach developed in the FP7 CONSENSUS
project and discussed in Bauer et al. (2012) and Knill et al. (2014). Crucially,
while we and Knill et al. adopt the same broad approach to understanding
dismantling, we employ different coding frameworks. Thus, while the Knill
et al. (2014) coding scheme was developed to capture changes to environ-
mental and social policies across 30 years and multiple countries – hence
requiring a coding approach applicable to multiple policy settings and juris-
dictional contexts – we employ a more ﬁne-grained approach to capture
very small changes to environmental policies in a single political system
(the EU).
Table 1. Different generations of directives and regulations targeted for dismantling.
Sector Legislation Generations
1 2 3 4 5 6
Water Drinking Water Directive 1980 1998
Groundwater Directive 1980 2006
Bathing Water Directive 1976 2006
Shellﬁsh Waters Directive 1979 2006
Waste Titanium Dioxide Industry (TDI)
Directive
1978 1982 1992 2010
Waste Electrical & Electronic
Equipment (WEEE) Directive
2000 2012
Packaging Waste Directive 1985 1994 2004
Waste Framework Directive 3 dir.
1975–1978
2 dir. 1991 2006 2008
Shipment of Waste Directive/
Regulation
1984 1986 1993 2006 2014
Restriction of the use of certain
Hazardous Substances (RoHS)
Directive
2002 2011
Air Air Quality Directive 5 dir.
1980–1992
5 dir.
1996–2004
2008
Sulphur Content (marine fuels)
Directive
1975 1987 1993 1999 2005 2012
Industry Eco-label Regulation 1992 2000 2010
Eco-Management and Audit scheme
(EMAS) Regulation
1993 2001 2009
SEVESO Directive 1982 1996 2003 2012
Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control (IPPC) Directive
1984 1996 2003 2008 2010
Environmental
assessment
Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) Directive
1982 1997 2003 2009 2012 2014
Nature &
biodiversity
Birds Directive 1979 1994 2009
Chemicals Ozone (Montreal Protocol) Regulation 1988 1991 1994 2000 2009
Source: European Commission (1993, 2003, 2014); Golub (1996); Hjerp et al. (2010); Wilkinson et al. (2005).
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By trading breadth for depth, our analysis exhibits two key advances on the
existing literature. First, in the number of dismantling dimensions studied, this
article distinguishes between changes to instrument scope and changes to
instrument settings, which Knill et al. combine within ‘substantial intensity’.
Second, in the type of policy instruments coded, as our coding scheme con-
siders changes within each directive or regulation, such as information
sharing, reporting duties etc. – not simply regulatory standards. But in line
with Knill et al. (2014), we chose not to code for formal intensity, the last dis-
mantling dimension identiﬁed in Bauer et al. (2012: 35), which includes admin-
istrative capacities and enforcement procedures. Changes to this dimension
can be very difﬁcult to interpret without an in depth knowledge of the
implementation traditions of different member states.
In summary, our coding scheme rests on the following key principles. First,
it measures the direction of policy change (expansion, status quo or disman-
tling) in legislative outputs, not changes in environmental outcomes or
impacts. Second, it measures change across three dimensions – density,
scope and settings – and two levels – the legislation as a whole but also its
constituting instruments – thereby producing six potential dismantling
dimensions (see Table 2). Third, changes were coded with the following
values: 0 for no change; 1 for expansion; –1 for dismantling; and n/a for
mixed change (i.e., if changes were unclear, or both expansion and disman-
tling occurred simultaneously).
Results: widespread yet limited dismantling
This section presents the results of coding policy change across multiple gen-
erations of the policies targeted for dismantling over a 22-year period. It does
so by measuring changes across six potential dismantling dimensions. Out of
Table 2. Six dimensions of policy change.
Dimension Deﬁnition Dismantling Examples
Legislative
density
Number of pieces of legislation in a
given policy area.
One framework directive replacing 6
directives.
Legislative
scope
Number of topics covered, or
recipients targeted by an item of
legislation.
Revising pollution rules to exclude smaller
factories.
Legislative
settings
Ambition of an item of legislation. Removing mentions of high standard of
environmental protection in legislative
objectives.
Instrument
density
Number of instruments within an item
of legislation.
Reducing instrument numbers.
Instrument
scope
Number of topics covered or
recipients targeted by instrument.
Revising to cover less environmental issues.
Instrument
settings
An instrument’s strictness or leniency. Raising the acceptable level of a pollutant.
Source: Own compilation.
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the 19 families of directives and regulations, three experienced no disman-
tling at all when reformed (Shellﬁsh Waters, Reduction of Hazardous Waste
[RoHS], Eco-management and audit scheme [EMAS]). The remaining 16
cases all experienced policy dismantling across a different number of dimen-
sions. Overall, policy dismantling was recorded in all dimensions except legis-
lative settings. Furthermore, Table 3 indicates a strong difference in frequency
along the different dimensions, with 28 occurrences of dismantling at the
instrument level compared to only ﬁve at the legislative level. These data
show that dismantling has occurred unevenly over multiple dimensions.
But how important has dismantling been vis-à-vis the other two possible
directions of reform, namely continuation of the status quo and expansion?
As most instances of dismantling appeared at the instrument level, the
rest of this section focuses on changes to instrument density, scope and
settings.
Instrument density
For an instrument to be coded as dismantled, it had to have either been
completely removed or been replaced by a different type of instrument.
Figure 1 sums changes across all generations of a directive or regulation.
Thus, for a directive (such as the Seveso Directive) spanning multiple gener-
ations (in this case, four), the density changes cover all changes that
occurred (i.e., between 1982 and 2012). Figure 1 shows that of the 10
cases which experienced a dismantling of instrument density, the Ground-
water and Bathing Water Directives are the only cases where dismantling
was a more frequent pattern of policy change than continuity and expansion
combined.
Dismantling is particularly important for the 2006 Bathing Water Directive
(2006/7/EC): 26 instruments were removed – such as mandatory values on pH,
phenols or dissolved oxygen in water – 10 instruments were added, with only
six remaining from the original (1976) directive (76/160/EEC). Conversely,
between 1984 (84/631/EEC) and 2006 (1013/2006/EU), Shipment of Waste
legislation lost four instruments and gained 30 new ones.
Instrument scope
Changes in scope and settings can be analysed for a subset of instruments
(i.e., maintained for more than one generation), as the direction of change
regarding both scope and settings is determined by comparing two gener-
ations of the same instrument.
Figure 2 shows that of the 19 pieces of legislation targeted for dismantling,
nine experienced a reduction in instrument scope. These took the form, for
example in the Eco-label Regulation, of changes in requirements governing
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Table 3. Instances of policy dismantling amongst selected environmental directives and regulations.
Legislative
density
Legislative
scope
Legislative
settings
Instrument
density
Instrument
scope
Instrument
settings
Drinking Water Directive X X
Groundwater Directive X X
Bathing Water Directive X X
Shellﬁsh Waters Directive
Titanium Dioxide Industry (TDI) Directive X X X
Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive X X
Packaging Waste Directive X X X
Waste Framework Directive X X X
Shipment of Waste Directive/Regulation X
Restriction of the use of certain Hazardous Substances (RoHS)
Directive
Air Quality Directive X X X X
Sulphur Content (Marine Fuels) Directive X X
Eco-label Regulation X
Eco-Management and Audit scheme (EMAS) Regulation
SEVESO Directive X X
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive X X
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive X X
Birds Directive X
Ozone (Montreal Protocol) Regulation X X
Source: Own data.
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the type of information to be made available to the public (Regulation 1980/
2000/EC) or the interest groups that had to be consulted (trade unions were
henceforth excluded) (Regulation 66/2010/EU). Of these nine, Shipment of
Waste (1013/2006/EU) was the only case in which dismantling was more fre-
quently observed than expansion.
Figure 2 further shows a signiﬁcant difference in the number of change
events coded for each piece of legislation. This difference is owing to two
factors. First, certain pieces of legislation employ a much greater number of
instruments than others (e.g., water pollution regulations have a large
number of standards). Second, changes to instrument density from one gen-
eration to another reduce the pool of instruments existing over multiple gen-
erations of the same piece of legislation. Hence, changes to instrument scope
and settings in the Bathing Water Directive could only be coded for the ﬁve
original instruments maintained in the 2006 directive.
Figure 2. Changes to instrument scope amongst selected environmental directives and
regulations.
Source: Own data.
Figure 1. Changes to instrument density amongst selected environmental directives and
regulations.
Source: Own data.
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Instrument settings
Concerning instrument settings, as shown in Figure 3, 11 of the 19 directives
and regulations escaped dismantling completely, and eight experienced
limited dismantling. These dismantling events took the form of increasing
the number of exemptions under a prohibition to export control substances
(the Ozone [Montreal Protocol] Regulations 2037/2000/EC and 1005/
2009/EC), or of reducing Commission involvement in combatting leakages
(Regulation 1005/2009/EC).
Once again, expansion and/or the continuation of the status quo were
more frequent directions of policy change than dismantling. The Drinking
Water Directive (98/83/EC) was the only case where dismantling, expressed
in terms of weaker standards for chloride, nitrites or sodium, occurred more
frequently than expansion.
Figure 4 compares the directions of change across all three instrument
dimensions, for all 47 reforms. Even though 29 of these 47 reforms occurred
after open calls for dismantling, the continuation of the status quo prevailed. It
further highlights differences across instrument dimensions: dismantling rates
were higher for instrument density (12 per cent) compared to scope and set-
Figure 3. Changes to instrument settings amongst selected environmental directives and
regulations.
Source: Own data.
Figure 4. Comparison of changes across instrument density, scope and settings.
Source: Own data.
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tings. The 18 reforms which did not take place after open calls for dismantling
had even lower dismantling rates – ranging from 6 per cent for instrument
density to 2 per cent for scope.
Conclusion: does the EU have a reverse gear?
This contribution has presented an original analysis of EU level policy disman-
tling. Starting from the assumption, which is common in both EU studies and
dismantling research, that policy dismantling is highly unlikely to occur at EU
level, it searched for dismantling in parts of the EU environmental acquis that
have been openly targeted for dismantling over a 22-year period. It investi-
gated whether these calls for dismantling were followed by changes to
policy outputs. Our coding exercise revealed that whilst dismantling has
taken place, the overall picture of policy change is a rather complex one.
Dismantling was the least frequent direction of policy change – behind
expansion and continuation of the status quo. This was the case for the 29
reforms which followed open calls for dismantling as well as for the 18
which did not, for which dismantling was even less frequent. Furthermore,
different dimensions of the same item of policy – scope, settings and
density – changed in different directions, often simultaneously, thus conﬁrm-
ing Pierson’s (2001: 427) earlier point about testing and accounting for the
‘multidimensionality’ of change.
These results conﬁrm that policy dismantling is taking place – that the EU
has a reverse gear. In other words, the EU is not only a driver of policy disman-
tling in its member states; it has become a new locus of dismantling in its own
right. These results, along with growing calls for austerity and cutting ‘red
tape’ at EU level, underline the need for more research to be undertaken.
First, how signiﬁcant is policy dismantling? How dismantling is deﬁned, how
it is measured and what type of dimensions is taken into consideration
(Green-Pedersen 2004) will determine how this question is answered.
The new coding scheme we have employed sought to capture multiple
directions of change across multiple internal dimensions of policy. But this
begs some additional questions. For example, is a change in scope more
important than a change in settings? When the same environmental policy
instrument experiences an expansion in scope but the settings are made
less ambitious, does one direction, or dimension, prevail over the other, and
under which conditions? Is dismantling in one instrument outweighed by
expansion in another? Our coding scheme was agnostic about the relative
importance of scope, settings or density changes. All change events were
given the same value, i.e., expansion in one dimension was not deemed to
compensate for dismantling in another. Alternative options exist – for
example, grading the environmental ambition of a measure (Burns et al.
2012) – but this raises other issues of scale and generalization, while requiring
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expert knowledge of each item of legislation. More work is also needed on
how dismantling discourses and changes in policy play out in and across
other policy sectors.
Second, what of the politics of dismantling? Why (and how) is dismantling
taking place at EU level? This contribution has provided the building blocks for
eventual explanations. Hence, it has shown that dismantling attempts are not
new at EU level. In fact, they predate recent calls for austerity by some 20
years. The observed mix of expansion, status quo and dismantling appears
to conﬁrm Bonoli’s (2001: 240) contention that political systems with a high
number of veto players are likely to witness dismantling being pursued along-
side attempts at expansion. The highly public nature of the ‘hit lists’ in the
1990s and the better regulation programmes of the 2010s do point towards
a tendency for ‘credit-claiming’ motivations to exceed blame-avoidance
ones when it comes to dismantling environmental policies (Jordan et al.
2013: 803). And ﬁnally, examples of policy dismantling occurring through
the EU legislative process appear to conﬁrm that supranational institutions,
namely the European Commission and the Parliament, are not ‘hard-wired
to seek ever closer union’ through policy expansion or even in favour of main-
taining the status quo (Bickerton, et al. 2015: 712). More research is needed to
understand their respective roles and rationale in pursuing policy dismantling.
Addressing these and other questions, such as the role of non-state actors,
constitute a rich and promising research agenda for EU level dismantling
research (cf. Jordan et al. 2013) that promises not only to move the topic
out of the analytical blind spot of EU scholars, but to add to the rapidly devel-
oping literature on dismantling in other contexts and time periods.
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